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augmented their appeal by sacrificing political commentary for more sport, fashion, and other populist features. 13 Many 'political' journals nonetheless boasted substantial circulations. These included, on the political right, Le Journal (411,021) and Le Matin (312,597), on the left, the communist Humanité (349,000) -the socialist Le Populaire only sold around 157,000 copies -and in the centre, the OEuvre (236,045). A number of regional papers also sold in excess of a quarter of a million copies, including the Petit Gironde and the La Dépêche de Toulouse. 14 
Le
Temps was also widely-cited, principally because it was seen as the semi- Bonnet. 15 The French press was a many-headed beast, comprising populist titles owned by wealthy proprietors, journals susceptible to government manipulation, and political papers that volubly and passionately articulated an ideological agenda. As Matt Perry remarks, 'press culture in 1930s
France was vibrant, partisan and venal'. 16 Despite this, British officials in Paris relied heavily on press content to inform their despatches. In fairness, few alternative sources existed; opinion polls were in their infancy and not trusted, especially by the French. 17 Cinema newsreels reached a large audience but were expensive to produce and lacked substantive commentary. Radio news was similarly limited in scope, but the rapid proliferation of radio sets in interwar Franceownership increasing from 5,000 at the end of the 1920s to more than 5 million a decade later -would prove significant. The power of radio and newsreels was soon recognised by politicians, and would be used to considerable effect by Édouard Daladier at the end of the decade. 18 But in the mid-1930s, newspapers remained the preferred evidential base, hardly surprising given that most British diplomats and politicians belonged to a generation that believed the press to be powerful, even as its status began to diminish. 19 Within the pages of contemporary French newspapers it is easy to find indications of a weak, divided, even 'decadent' society, helplessly reliant on British support. Prior to the 1936 elections that ushered in the Popular Front, many French journals expressed concern at the social divisions that plagued the nation at a time of growing external peril; one writer in the Catholic paper La Croix even compared the situation to 1914. 20 The external peril was amplified by Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland, which generated a neo-pacifist response on the French right ('Surtout pas de guerre') rooted in an ideological hostility towards Communism, both domestic and international. Newspapers thus perpetuated an image of a divided France incapable of opposing Nazi Germany. 21 These divisions were duly reported to London, although far greater emphasis was placed on a rare area of consensus -the need for a co-ordinated Anglo-French response. Any indication of discord between Paris and London caused consternation;
Britain's ambassador in Paris from 1933 to April 1937, Sir George Clerk, noted French alarm at an apparent 'divergence between the French and British points of view'. 22 The outcome of the 1936 election ensured that the press subsequently prioritized domestic over foreign news, and when the latter did featurenotably vis-à-vis the Spanish Civil War -the prevailing message was that Anglo-French co-operation was paramount. Only far-left journals intimated that France could steer a foreign policy course independently of Britain.
Charles Corbin, France's ambassador in London (1933-40) , noted that the British were similarly convinced that France's 'internal problems' prevented Paris from pursuing a firm and independent policy. 23 Germany. 25 The Intransigeant urged calm, reminding its readership of the external menace and warning that a civil war would precipitate a foreign one. 26 Extreme-right journals lamented the 'decomposition' of French parliamentary politics and the pro-Soviet direction of the Popular Front's foreign policy. 27 But others sought to reduce ideological tensions. Ahead of Bastille Day, right-leaning French war veterans were warned against turning the Champs Elysée into a 'banal battlefield' between patriots and police, as this would only reinforce perceptions of French disorder when the existential threat demanded unity and sang-froid. 28 Repeated allusions to unrest in the French press, especially rhetoric of 'civil war', undoubtedly reverberated overseas. For British observers, as Herman insists, the emergent picture was of a France plagued by political, social and economic weaknesses: 'It would be a truism to state that France was on the brink of civil war with the country almost equally divided between left and right'. 29 The wave of sit-in strikes that beset the fledgling Popular Front government during the summer of 1936 prompted partisan press commentary in France that subsequently informed British perceptions. Although British embassy staff tapped into other sources of information -personal contacts, consular reports, visiting sites of strike action, attending rallies, scrutinizing parliamentary debates, etc. -newspapers were an ever-present when trying to make sense of a fluid situation. 30 Hugh Lloyd Thomas, minister at the Paris embassy, tried to resist the 'alarmist exaggerations' in the press, but confessed nevertheless that the situation was dire, especially from the diplomatic perspective. 'One cannot help feeling' he wrote, 'that for the moment at least the French Government as a fighting force has ceased to exist'. 31 Clerk also acknowledged a reliance on newspapers, noting how his day-to-day reports were 'based on information published in the press and on reports I have received from His Majesty's consular officers'. 32 Although optimism resurfaced as the 1936 strikes subsided, confidence in France was routinely shaken by the frequent re-emergence of social unrest.
As the Radical Deputy, Lucien Lamoureux, recalled, the factory occupations, the Clichy riots in 1937, and the difficulties experienced in hosting the Paris International Exposition that same year, combined to fuel a belief elsewhere in Europe that France 'was in the grip of a sort of revolutionary anarchy'. 33 Within the Popular Front, the Radical-Socialists grew alarmed at negative British perceptions. Jacques Kayser, one of the Radical's 'Young Turks', remarked how the British were not irreconcilably hostile to the Front Populaire, but insisted nevertheless that a French financial 'recovery' was essential. 34 Persistent domestic turmoil certainly troubled many in Britain, and for Conservatives in particular the pernicious influence of Communism was sufficient reason to interpret any British commitment to France as a 'liability'. 35 By early 1937, Corbin noted that British hostility towards a continental commitment was no longer confined to conservative or isolationist papers. Even the Morning Post, he observed, traditionally so 'faithfully attached' to the entente, now published editorials criticizing French policy. 36 That Britain might desert France was a troubling prospect. France's President, Albert Lebrun, told journalists in February 1937 that newspaper content was exploited abroad to attack an apparently unstable and fragmented France; journalists must henceforth do their duty by presenting instead an image of a united, calm, orderly and industrious nation. 37 cuttings in his personal papers reflect a concern that his actions might incur the wrath of the French people. Unlike Chamberlain, who confidently brushed aside press criticism, Daladier was profoundly perturbed by hostile media voices, particularly those emanating from the left. Also unlike his British counterpart, the French premier eschewed hubristic claims of securing peace for a generation. Instead, he used a radio broadcast to urge the French people to remain 'united, hardworking and strong', the only possible safeguard of both domestic and world peace. 48 Bonnet too was fixated by French press coverage, and in conversations with British embassy staff he habitually accused hostile journals of being in the pay of Moscow.
Phipps proved receptive to the foreign minister's lamentations, accepting Bonnet's claims that both l'Époque and l'Ordre were backed by Russia, even accusing the latter's director, Émile Buré, of being 'a slave of the Soviets'. 49 After Munich the French government attempted to augment its control over the media. On 2 November, Daladier told Phipps that he intended to issue a new decree-law to prevent press attacks 'upon foreign statesmen', no doubt According to Phipps, the same two journals were the only ones that received news of Chamberlain's impending Paris visit with scepticism rather than enthusiasm. 50 The French press was clearly divided along munichois and To defeat the strike and rally the French people to his side, Daladier once more turned to the microphone. In a radio broadcast coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of the Armistice, the chef de gouvernement stressed his credentials as a war veteran, portraying the brotherhood of the anciens combattants as an exemplar of national unity for the rest of the country to emulate. To withstand the external threat, he insisted, France must be morally and materially strong. 52 There is evidence that Daladier's appeals to the country were working. Within his personal papers is a note that stated simply, 'For peace and French security, it would evidently be preferable to work than to strike. Such is the general opinion of the French people, disgusted by the attitude of the Communists'. 53 Furthermore, on 28
November, after a well-publicized and highly successful visit to Paris by Chamberlain and Halifax, Daladier's press service noted how Parisian and provincial papers alike bemoaned the 'current social agitation' which could only harm France's position during the ongoing 'international negotiations'. 54 That the General Strike was having a negative impact on British opinion had already been emphasized by Corbin, who warned that France's 'internal strife' was the issue that 'eclipsed all others' in British press coverage. 55 Daladier's use of the radio was proving effective at home, but for British observers this medium was less significant than the printed page. In the build-up to the General Strike, Daladier, Reynaud and Anatole de Monzie (minister for public works) all took to the airwaves urging discipline, and although Phipps acknowledged that these broadcasts enjoyed 'a wide reception among wireless listeners', he regretted that the 'newspapers of the extreme left do not publish them fully, but only give garbled versions'. 56 . Of all the forms of media in operation, British officials still gave primacy to the printed press. In mid-November 1938, the Paris embassy's press attaché, Charles Mendl, had lengthy conversations with two prominent French journalists, André Géraud ('Pertinax') and Geneviève Tabouis. Both suggested that French strength and stability could be regained if Paul Reynaud's programme of financial redressement was successful. 57 unanimous' in its desire to stand firm against the Italians, and that any attempt on Chamberlain's part to mediate would be ill-received. 61 If Daladier had, as Benjamin Martin claims, received 'a gift from Mussolini' courtesy of the latter's ill-judged demands, 62 he played his hand adroitly.
Firstly, the claims fostered a spirit of French unity that was used to denigrate those on the left espousing social and industrial agitation. Secondly, they provided an opportunity to indulge in a celebration of French imperial grandeur. Where previously a perception of imperial decay was used to legitimize appeasement in Europe 63 , the imperial theme was used after Munich as a symbol of strength rather than weakness. 64 The use of newsreels to project France's imperial prestige demonstrated the government's growing attentiveness to the potential of this medium to reach vast audiences. Indeed, French cinema attendance peaked during the late-1930s, with nearly three-quarters of Parisians regularly attending in 1939. 65 As well as projecting France's imperial might, newsreels were also used to showcase defensive fortifications at home. A Pathé-Journal newsreel shown on 30 November 1938 reassured viewers that they could feel 'safe in their homes'. 66 The date of broadcast is salient, coinciding with the National Strike. The message was unambiguous, bringing into sharper focus the failure of the French left (at least its leadership) to defend their country.
Although the emergent picture was contradictory -proclaiming France to be safe from attack whilst simultaneously suggesting that social unrest rendered France vulnerable 67 -it helped undermine the legitimacy of Daladier's far-left critics. A wedge was driven between the extremist leadership and the rank-and-file, most of the latter shying away from agitation and demonstrating a willingness to contribute to national defence. 68 In light of the Italian claims, imperial unity and strength featured prominently in newsreels. 
French newspapers welcomed his firmness, Phipps informing London that
Daladier's claim that France 'had never been so united' was entirely justified. 75 Daladier had, albeit belatedly, lived up to his reputation as a 'strong man', and his use of the airwaves has led one historian to label him 'L'homme de radio'. 76 He also demonstrated opportunism, exploiting the Prague coup to secure greater governmental powers (pleins pouvoirs) justified as essential for national defence. As the British embassy reported, his request for full powers was broadly welcomed by a public that was 'less concerned with party disputes than [with] firmness and leadership from the Government'. 77 He continued to rally popular support for his policies via published and broadcast speeches. On 27 June, before the Chamber of Deputies, he reiterated French unity and determination to withstand external aggression. 78 Daladier's firm language, noted Corbin, is 'welcomed in England' as evidence 'of the sacrifices being made' by the French people. 79 His government's success in galvanising a previously fractured country did not go unrecognised at the time. As Lamoureux recalled, Daladier's popularity was extraordinarily high, having stabilised the government, reestablished order, improved the nation's finances, and adopted a firmer line against the Dictators. 80 The Paris embassy largely concurred, suggesting that the severity of the international crisis had silenced 'all but the most irreconcilable critics', the majority of the French populace seeking a 'strong Government' rather than a 're-intensification of party quarrels'. 81 In little over a year since becoming President of the Council, Daladier had made a concerted effort to use the media to harness support and reinvigorate the French nation. As Alexander Werth observed, Daladier 'took upon himself the task of preparing France … both materially and psychologically' for war. In sparking this French 'revivalism', however, he occasionally assumed a 'dictatorial air'; Werth even suggested that there was a 'streak of Vichy-ism' to Daladier, and this is evident in his treatment of the media. 82 On 4 February 1939, a decree law brought radio news broadcasts under the central control of the centre permanent de l'information générale. 83 The printed press was a harder beast to tame, but here too Daladier 
